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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 January 1952

SUBJECT: DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-27/1: CHINESE COMMUNIST
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN
(For Board Consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions
with respect to Taiwan through mid-1952.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST SITUATION

A. What Chinese Communist Forces are now in position to
assault Taiwan?

1. Ground Forces

a. Strength

b. Disposition

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- c. Combat effectiveness (compared to Nationalist Ground Forces) with particular reference to specialized units such as amphibious and airborne units

2. Air Forces

- a. Strength
- b. Disposition
- c. Combat effectiveness (compared to Nationalist Air Forces and to US Air Forces likely to be employed against them in an assault on Taiwan)
- d. Airlift capabilities

3. Naval Forces

- a. Strength
- b. Disposition
- c. Combat effectiveness (compared to Nationalist Naval Forces and US Naval Forces likely to be employed against them in an assault on Taiwan)
- d. Waterlift capability

B. Under present circumstances (i.e., continuation of the war in Korea, present requirements for internal security, and present scale and nature of Chinese Communist commitment in Southeast Asia) what additional forces could the Chinese Communists make available for an assault on Taiwan?

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C. What gaps are apparent in Chinese Communist capabilities?

1. To what extent will the USSR compensate for these deficiencies?

D. On the basis of points A, B, and C above, what would be the scale and nature of a maximum Chinese Communist effort?

1. Strength and composition

2. Most feasible time for utilization of this force

3. Capability for achieving surprise

4. Capability for reinforcement and resupply

E. What are Chinese Communist capabilities for infiltration of Taiwan prior to the assault?

II. THE CHINESE NATIONALIST SITUATION

A. What is the strength, disposition, composition, and combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Armed Forces?
(Review contributions to SE-20)

B. What are the factors in the political and economic situation on Taiwan that affect the capabilities of the Nationalist Armed Forces? How do these factors affect the Armed Forces?

C. What is the scope and nature of the Chinese Communist subversive effort on Taiwan? How does this effort affect Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?

III. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON
TAIWAN

- A. What are Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?
 - 1. Against a maximum Chinese Communist effort as envisioned in I,D above?
 - 2. Against a limited surprise attack?
- B. What is the scope and nature of assistance the Nationalists would require for the successful defense of Taiwan?

IV. HOW DO THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INFLUENCE CHINESE COMMUNIST
INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?

- A. Over-all Soviet policy
- B. Possible US counter-action
- C. The Korean situation
 - 1. Tactical
 - 2. Truce Negotiations
- D. Possible reactions in all non-Communist areas in the Far East

V. WHAT ARE THE INDICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?

- A. Military Preparations
- B. Domestic Propaganda
- C. Foreign Propaganda
- D. UN Negotiations
- E. Other

IV. WHAT ARE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?